An Anatomy of Surrender

From: City Journal

Motivated by fear and multiculturalism, too many Westerners are acquiescing to creeping sharia.

Islam divides the world into two parts. The part governed by sharia, or Islamic law, is called the Dar al-Islam, or House of Submission. Everything else is the Dar al-Harb, or House of War, so called because it will take war—holy war, jihad—to bring it into the House of Submission. Over the centuries, this jihad has taken a variety of forms. Two centuries ago, for instance, Muslim pirates from North Africa captured ships and enslaved their crews, leading the U.S. to fight the Barbary Wars of 1801–05 and 1815. In recent decades, the jihadists’ weapon of choice has usually been the terrorist’s bomb; the use of planes as missiles on 9/11 was a variant of this method.

What has not been widely recognized is that the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa against Satanic Verses author Salman Rushdie introduced a new kind of jihad. Instead of assaulting Western ships or buildings, Kho­meini took aim at a fundamental Western freedom: freedom of speech. In recent years, other Islamists have joined this crusade, seeking to undermine Western societies’ basic liberties and extend sharia within those societies.

The cultural jihadists have enjoyed disturbing success. Two events in particular—the 2004 assassination in Amsterdam of Theo van Gogh in retaliation for his film about Islam’s oppression of women, and the global wave of riots, murders, and vandalism that followed a Danish newspaper’s 2005 publication of cartoons satirizing Mohammed—have had a massive ripple effect throughout the West. Motivated variously, and doubtless sometimes simultaneously, by fear, misguided sympathy, and multicultural ideology—which teaches us to belittle our freedoms and to genuflect to non-Western cultures, however repressive—people at every level of Western society, but especially elites, have allowed concerns about what fundamentalist Muslims will feel, think, or do to influence their actions and expressions. These Westerners have begun, in other words, to internalize the strictures of sharia, and thus implicitly to accept the deferential status of dhimmis—infidels living in Muslim societies.

Call it a cultural surrender. The House of War is slowly—or not so slowly, in Europe’s case—being absorbed into the House of Submission.

The Western media are in the driver’s seat on this road to sharia. Often their approach is to argue that we’re the bad guys. After the late Dutch sociologist-turned-politician Pim Fortuyn sounded the alarm about the danger that Europe’s Islamization posed to democracy, elite journalists labeled him a threat. A New York Times headline described him as marching the dutch to the right. Dutch newspapers Het Parool and De Volkskrant compared him with Mussolini; Trouw likened him to Hitler. The man (a multiculturalist, not a Muslim) who murdered him in May 2002 seemed to echo such verdicts when explaining his motive: Fortuyn’s views on Islam, the killer insisted, were “dangerous.”

Perhaps no Western media outlet has exhibited this habit of moral inversion more regularly than the BBC. In 2006, to take a typical example, Manchester’s top imam told psychotherapist John Casson that he supported the death penalty for homosexuality. Casson expressed shock—and the BBC, in a dispatch headlined imam accused of “gay death” slur, spun the controversy as an effort by Casson to discredit Islam. The BBC concluded its story with comments from an Islamic Human Rights Commission spokesman, who equated Muslim attitudes toward homosexuality with those of “other orthodox religions, such as Catholicism” and complained that focusing on the issue was “part of demonizing Muslims.”

In June 2005, the BBC aired the documentary Don’t Panic, I’m Islamic, which sought to portray concerns about Islamic radicalism as overblown. This “stunning whitewash of radical Islam,” as Little Green Footballs blogger Charles Johnson put it, “helped keep the British public fast asleep, a few weeks before the bombs went off in London subways and buses” in July 2005. In December 2007, it emerged that five of the documentary’s subjects, served up on the show as examples of innocuous Muslims-next-door, had been charged in those terrorist attacks—and that BBC producers, though aware of their involvement after the attacks took place, had not reported important information about them to the police.

Press acquiescence to Muslim demands and threats is endemic. When the Mohammed cartoons—published in September 2005 by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten to defy rising self-censorship after van Gogh’s murder—were answered by worldwide violence, only one major American newspaper, the Philadelphia Inquirer, joined such European dailies as Die Welt and El País in reprinting them as a gesture of free-speech solidarity. Editors who refused to run the images claimed that their motive was multicultural respect for Islam. Critic Christopher Hitchens believed otherwise, writing that he “knew quite a number of the editors concerned and can say for a certainty that the chief motive for ‘restraint’ was simple fear.” Exemplifying the new dhimmitude, whatever its motivation, was Norway’s leading cartoonist, Finn Graff, who had often depicted Israelis as Nazis, but who now vowed not to draw anything that might provoke Muslim wrath. (On a positive note, this February, over a dozen Danish newspapers, joined by a number of other papers around the world, reprinted one of the original cartoons as a free-speech gesture after the arrest of three people accused of plotting to kill the artist.)

Last year brought another cartoon crisis—this time over Swedish artist Lars Vilks’s drawings of Mohammed as a dog, which ambassadors from Muslim countries used as an excuse to demand speech limits in Sweden. CNN reporter Paula Newton suggested that perhaps “Vilks should have known better” because of the Jyllands-Posten incident—as if people who make art should naturally take their marching orders from people who make death threats. Meanwhile, The Economist depicted Vilks as an eccentric who shouldn’t be taken “too seriously” and noted approvingly that Sweden’s prime minister, unlike Denmark’s, invited the ambassadors “in for a chat.”

The elite media regularly underreport fundamentalist Muslim misbehavior or obfuscate its true nature. After the knighting of Rushdie in 2007 unleashed yet another wave of international Islamist mayhem, Tim Rutten wrote in the Los Angeles Times: “If you’re wondering why you haven’t been able to follow all the columns and editorials in the American press denouncing all this homicidal nonsense, it’s because there haven’t been any.” Or consider the riots that gripped immigrant suburbs in France in the autumn of 2005. These uprisings were largely assertions of Muslim authority over Muslim neighborhoods, and thus clearly jihadist in character. Yet weeks passed before many American press outlets mentioned them—and when they did, they de-emphasized the rioters’ Muslim identity (few cited the cries of “Allahu akbar,” for instance). Instead, they described the violence as an outburst of frustration over economic injustice.

When polls and studies of Muslims appear, the media often spin the results absurdly or drop them down the memory hole after a single news cycle. Journalists celebrated the results of a 2007 Pew poll showing that 80 percent of American Muslims aged 18 to 29 said that they opposed suicide bombing—even though the flip side, and the real story, was that a double-digit percentage of young American Muslims admitted that they supported it. u.s. muslims assimilated, opposed to extremism, the Washington Post rejoiced, echoing USA Today’s american muslims reject extremes. A 2006 Daily Telegraph survey showed that 40 percent of British Muslims wanted sharia in Britain—yet British reporters often write as though only a minuscule minority embraced such views.

After each major terrorist act since 9/11, the press has dutifully published stories about Western Muslims fearing an “anti-Muslim backlash”—thus neatly shifting the focus from Islamists’ real acts of violence to non-Muslims’ imaginary ones. (These backlashes, of course, never materialize.) While books by Islam experts like Bat Ye’or and Robert Spencer, who tell difficult truths about jihad and sharia, go unreviewed in newspapers like the New York Times, the elite press legitimizes thinkers like Karen Armstrong and John Esposito, whose sugarcoated representations of Islam should have been discredited for all time by 9/11. The Times described Armstrong’s hagiography of Mohammed as “a good place to start” learning about Islam; in July 2007, the Washington Post headlined a piece by Esposito want to understand islam? start here.

Mainstream outlets have also served up anodyne portraits of fundamentalist Muslim life. Witness Andrea Elliott’s affectionate three-part profile of a Brooklyn imam, which appeared in the New York Times in March 2006. Elliott and the Times sought to portray Reda Shata as a heroic bridge builder between two cultures, leaving readers with the comforting belief that the growth of Islam in America was not only harmless but positive, even beautiful. Though it emerged in passing that Shata didn’t speak English, refused to shake women’s hands, wanted to forbid music, and supported Hamas and suicide bombing, Elliott did her best to downplay such unpleasant details; instead, she focused on sympathetic personal particulars. “Islam came to him softly, in the rhythms of his grandmother’s voice”; “Mr. Shata discovered love 15 years ago. . . . ‘She entered my heart,‘ said the imam.” Elliott’s saccharine piece won a Pulitzer Prize. When Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes pointed out that Shata was obviously an Islamist, a writer for the Columbia Journalism Review dismissed Pipes as “right-wing” and insisted that Shata was “very moderate.”

So it goes in this upside-down, not-so-brave new media world: those who, if given the power, would subjugate infidels, oppress women, and execute apostates and homosexuals are “moderate” (a moderate, these days, apparently being anybody who doesn’t have explosives strapped to his body), while those who dare to call a spade a spade are “Islamophobes.”

The entertainment industry has been nearly as appalling. During World War II, Hollywood churned out scores of films that served the war effort, but today’s movies and TV shows, with very few exceptions, either tiptoe around Islam or whitewash it. In the whitewash category were two sitcoms that debuted in 2007, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s Little Mosque on the Prairie and CW’s Aliens in America. Both shows are about Muslims confronting anti-Muslim bigotry; both take it for granted that there’s no fundamentalist Islam problem in the West, but only an anti-Islam problem.

Muslim pressure groups have actively tried to keep movies and TV shows from portraying Islam as anything but a Religion of Peace. For example, the Council for American-Islamic Relations successfully lobbied Paramount Pictures to change the bad guys in The Sum of All Fears (2002) from Islamist terrorists to neo-Nazis, while Fox’s popular series 24, after Muslims complained about a story line depicting Islamic terrorists, ran cringe-worthy public-service announcements emphasizing how nonviolent Islam was. Earlier this year, Iranian-Danish actor Farshad Kholghi noted that, despite the cartoon controversy’s overwhelming impact on Denmark, “not a single movie has been made about the crisis, not a single play, not a single stand-up monologue.” Which, of course, is exactly what the cartoon jihadists wanted.

In April 2006, an episode of the animated series South Park admirably mocked the wave of self-censorship that followed the Jyllands-Posten crisis—but Comedy Central censored it, replacing an image of Mohammed with a black screen and an explanatory notice. According to series producer Anne Garefino, network executives frankly admitted that they were acting out of fear. “We were happy,” she told an interviewer, “that they didn’t try to claim that it was because of religious tolerance.”

Then there’s the art world. Postmodern artists who have always striven to shock and offend now maintain piously that Islam deserves “respect.” Museums and galleries have quietly taken down paintings that might upset Muslims and have put into storage manuscripts featuring images of Mohammed. London’s Whitechapel Art Gallery removed life-size nude dolls by surrealist artist Hans Bellmer from a 2006 exhibit just before its opening; the official excuse was “space constraints,” but the curator admitted that the real reason was fear that the nudity might offend the gallery’s Muslim neighbors. Last November, after the cancellation of a show in The Hague of artworks depicting gay men in Mohammed masks, the artist, Sooreh Hera, charged the museum with giving in to Muslim threats. Tim Marlow of London’s White Cube Gallery notes that such self-censorship by artists and museums is now common, though “very few people have explicitly admitted” it. British artist Grayson Perry, whose work has mercilessly mocked Christianity, is one who has—and his reluctance isn’t about multicultural sensitivity. “The reason I haven’t gone all out attacking Islamism in my art,” he told the Times of London, “is because I feel real fear that someone will slit my throat.”

Leading liberal intellectuals and academics have shown a striking willingness to betray liberal values when it comes to pacifying Muslims. Back in 2001, Unni Wikan, a distinguished Norwegian cultural anthropologist and Islam expert, responded to the high rate of Muslim-on-infidel rape in Oslo by exhorting women to “realize that we live in a multicultural society and adapt themselves to it.”

More recently, high-profile Europe experts Ian Buruma of Bard College and Timothy Garton Ash of Oxford, while furiously denying that they advocate cultural surrender, have embraced “accommodation,” which sounds like a distinction without a difference. In his book Murder in Amsterdam, Buruma approvingly quotes Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen’s call for “accommodation with the Muslims,” including those “who consciously discriminate against their women.” Sharia enshrines a Muslim man’s right to beat and rape his wife, to force marriages on his daughters, and to kill them if they resist. One wonders what female Muslims who immigrated to Europe to escape such barbarity think of this prescription.

Rowan Williams, the archbishop of Canterbury and one of Britain’s best-known public intellectuals, suggested in February the institution of a parallel system of sharia law in Britain. Since the Islamic Sharia Council already adjudicates Muslim marriages and divorces in the U.K., what Williams was proposing was, as he put it, “a much enhanced and quite sophisticated version of such a body, with increased resources.” Gratifyingly, his proposal, short on specifics and long on academic doublespeak (“I don’t think,” he told the BBC, “that we should instantly spring to the conclusion that the whole of that world of jurisprudence and practice is somehow monstrously incompatible with human rights, simply because it doesn’t immediately fit with how we understand it”) was greeted with public outrage.

Another prominent accommodationist is humanities professor Mark Lilla of Columbia University, author of an August 2007 essay in the New York Times Magazine so long and languorous, and written with such perfect academic dispassion, that many readers may have finished it without realizing that it charted a path leading straight to sharia. Muslims’ “full reconciliation with modern liberal democracy cannot be expected,” Lilla wrote. For the West, “coping is the order of the day, not defending high principle.”

Revealing in this light is Buruma’s and Garton Ash’s treatment of author Ayaan Hirsi Ali—perhaps the greatest living champion of Western freedom in the face of creeping jihad—and of the Europe-based Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan. Because Hirsi Ali refuses to compromise on liberty, Garton Ash has called her a “simplistic . . . Enlightenment fundamentalist”—thus implicitly equating her with the Muslim fundamentalists who have threatened to kill her—while Buruma, in several New York Times pieces, has portrayed her as a petulant naif. (Both men have lately backed off somewhat.) On the other hand, the professors have rhapsodized over Ramadan’s supposed brilliance. They aren’t alone: though he’s clearly not the Westernized, urbane intellectual he seems to be—he refuses to condemn the stoning of adulteresses and clearly looks forward to a Europe under sharia—this grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and protégé of Islamist scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi regularly wins praise in bien-pensant circles as representing the best hope for long-term concord between Western Muslims and non-Muslims.

This spring, Harvard law professor Noah Feldman, writing in the New York Times Magazine, actually gave two cheers for sharia. He contrasted it favorably with English common law, and described “the Islamists’ aspiration to renew old ideas of the rule of law” as “bold and noble.”
With the press, the entertainment industry, and prominent liberal thinkers all refusing to defend basic Western liberties, it’s not surprising that our political leaders have been pusillanimous, too. After a tiny Oslo newspaper, Magazinet, reprinted the Danish cartoons in early 2006, jihadists burned Norwegian flags and set fire to Norway’s embassy in Syria. Instead of standing up to the vandals, Norwegian leaders turned on Magazinet’s editor, Vebjørn Selbekk, partially blaming him for the embassy burning and pressing him to apologize. He finally gave way at a government-sponsored press conference, groveling before an assemblage of imams whose leader publicly forgave him and placed him under his protection. On that terrible day, Selbekk later acknowledged, “Norway went a long way toward allowing freedom of speech to become the Islamists’ hostage.” As if that capitulation weren’t disgrace enough, an official Norwegian delegation then traveled to Qatar and implored Qaradawi—a defender of suicide bombers and the murder of Jewish children—to accept Selbekk’s apology. “To meet Yusuf al-Qaradawi under the present circumstances,” Norwegian-Iraqi writer Walid al-Kubaisi protested, was “tantamount to granting extreme Islamists . . . a right of joint consultation regarding how Norway should be governed.”

The UN’s position on the question of speech versus “respect” for Islam was clear—and utterly at odds with its founding value of promoting human rights. “You don’t joke about other people’s religion,” Kofi Annan lectured soon after the Magazinet incident, echoing the sermons of innumerable imams, “and you must respect what is holy for other people.” In October 2006, at a UN panel discussion called “Cartooning for Peace,” Under Secretary General Shashi Tharoor proposed drawing “a very thin blue UN line . . . between freedom and responsibility.” (Americans might be forgiven for wondering whether that line would strike through the First Amendment.) And in 2007, the UN’s Human Rights Council passed a Pakistani motion prohibiting defamation of religion.

Other Western government leaders have promoted the expansion of the Dar al-Islam. In September 2006, when philosophy teacher Robert Redeker went into hiding after receiving death threats over a Le Figaro op-ed on Islam, France’s then–prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, commented that “everyone has the right to express their opinions freely—at the same time that they respect others, of course.” The lesson of the Redeker affair, he said, was “how vigilant we must be to ensure that people fully respect one another in our society.” Villepin got a run for his money last year from his Swedish counterpart, Fredrik Reinfeldt, who, after meeting with Muslim ambassadors to discuss the Vilks cartoons, won praise from one of them, Algeria’s Merzak Bedjaoui, for his “spirit of appeasement.”

When, years after September 11, President George W. Bush finally acknowledged publicly that the West was at war with Islamic fascism, Muslims’ and multiculturalists’ furious reaction made him retreat to the empty term “war on terror.” Britain’s Foreign Office has since deemed even that phrase offensive and banned its use by cabinet members (along with “Islamic extremism”). In January, the Home Office decided that Islamic terrorism would henceforth be described as “anti-Islamic activity.”

Western legislatures and courts have reinforced the “spirit of appeasement.” In 2005, Norway’s parliament, with virtually no public discussion or media coverage, criminalized religious insults (and placed the burden of proof on the defendant). Last year, that country’s most celebrated lawyer, Tor Erling Staff, argued that the punishment for honor killing should be less than for other murders, because it’s arrogant for us to expect Muslim men to conform to our society’s norms. Also in 2007, in one of several instances in which magistrates sworn to uphold German law have followed sharia instead, a Frankfurt judge rejected a Muslim woman’s request for a quick divorce from her brutally abusive husband; after all, under the Koran he had the right to beat her.

Those who dare to defy the West’s new sharia-based strictures and speak their minds now risk prosecution in some countries. In 2006, legendary author Oriana Fallaci, dying of cancer, went on trial in Italy for slurring Islam; three years earlier, she had defended herself in a French court against a similar charge. (Fallaci was ultimately found not guilty in both cases.) More recently, Canadian provinces ordered publisher Ezra Levant and journalist Mark Steyn to face human rights tribunals, the former for reprinting the Jyllands-Posten cartoons, the latter for writing critically about Islam in Maclean’s.

Even as Western authorities have hassled Islam’s critics, they’ve honored jihadists and their supporters. In 2005, Queen Elizabeth knighted Iqbal Sacranie of the Muslim Council of Britain, a man who had called for the death of Salman Rushdie. Also that year, London mayor Ken Livingstone ludicrously praised Qaradawi as “progressive”—and, in response to gay activists who pointed out that Qaradawi had defended the death penalty for homosexuals, issued a dissertation-length dossier whitewashing the Sunni scholar and trying to blacken the activists’ reputations. Of all the West’s leaders, however, few can hold a candle to Piet Hein Donner, who in 2006, as Dutch minister of justice, said that if voters wanted to bring sharia to the Netherlands—where Muslims will soon be a majority in major cities—“it would be a disgrace to say, ‘This is not permitted!’ ”

If you don’t find the dhimmification of politicians shocking, consider the degree to which law enforcement officers have yielded to Islamist pressure. Last year, when “Undercover Mosque,” an unusually frank exposé on Britain’s Channel 4, showed “moderate” Muslim preachers calling for the beating of wives and daughters and the murder of gays and apostates, police leaped into action—reporting the station to the government communications authority, Ofcom, for stirring up racial hatred. (Ofcom, to its credit, rejected the complaint.) The police reaction, as James Forsyth noted in the Spectator, “revealed a mindset that views the exposure of a problem as more of a problem than the problem itself.” Only days after the “Undercover Mosque” broadcast—in a colossal mark of indifference to the reality that it exposed—Metropolitan Police commissioner Sir Ian Blair announced plans to share antiterrorist intelligence with Muslim community leaders. These plans, fortunately, were later shelved.

Canadian Muslim reformist Irshad Manji has noted that in 2006, when 17 terrorists were arrested in Toronto on the verge of giving Canada “its own 9/11,” “the police did not mention that it had anything to do with Islam or Muslims, not a word.” When, after van Gogh’s murder, a Rotterdam artist drew a street mural featuring an angel and the words thou shalt not kill, police, fearing Muslim displeasure, destroyed the mural (and a videotape of its destruction). In July 2007, a planned TV appeal by British cops to help capture a Muslim rapist was canceled to avoid “racist backlash.” And in August, the Times of London reported that “Asian” men (British code for “Muslims”) in the U.K. were having sex with perhaps hundreds of “white girls as young as twelve”—but that authorities wouldn’t take action for fear of “upsetting race relations.” Typically, neither the Times nor government officials acknowledged that the “Asian” men’s contempt for the “white” girls was a matter not of race but of religion.

Even military leaders aren’t immune. In 2005, columnist Diana West noted that America’s Iraq commander, Lieutenant General John R. Vines, was educating his staff in Islam by giving them a reading list that “whitewashes jihad, dhimmitude and sharia law with the works of Karen Armstrong and John Esposito”; two years later, West noted the unwillingness of a counterinsurgency advisor, Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, to mention jihad. In January 2008, the Pentagon fired Stephen Coughlin, its resident expert on sharia and jihad; reportedly, his acknowledgment that terrorism was motivated by jihad had antagonized an influential Muslim aide. “That Coughlin’s analyses would even be considered ‘controversial,’ ” wrote Andrew Bostom, editor of The Legacy of Jihad, “is pathognomonic of the intellectual and moral rot plaguing our efforts to combat global terrorism.” (Perhaps owing to public outcry, officials announced in February that Coughlin would not be dismissed after all, but instead moved to another Department of Defense position.)

Enough. We need to recognize that the cultural jihadists hate our freedoms because those freedoms defy sharia, which they’re determined to impose on us. So far, they have been far less successful at rolling back freedom of speech and other liberties in the U.S. than in Europe, thanks in no small part to the First Amendment. Yet America is proving increasingly susceptible to their pressures.

The key question for Westerners is: Do we love our freedoms as much as they hate them? Many free people, alas, have become so accustomed to freedom, and to the comfortable position of not having to stand up for it, that they’re incapable of defending it when it’s imperiled—or even, in many cases, of recognizing that it is imperiled. As for Muslims living in the West, surveys suggest that many of them, though not actively involved in jihad, are prepared to look on passively—and some, approvingly—while their coreligionists drag the Western world into the House of Submission.

But we certainly can’t expect them to take a stand for liberty if we don’t stand up for it ourselves.

Bruce Bawer is the author of While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West from Within. He blogs at BruceBawer.com.

Visto en: BlogBis

Europa: El cansancio socialdemócrata.

En los ochenta, el conocido sociólogo anglo alemán Ralf Dahrendorf definió la política europea como el reino del ’consenso socialdemócrata’.

Según él, al término de la Segunda Guerra Mundial se había instalado en todos los países democráticos del Viejo Continente una forma de pensar que había afectado transversalmente tanto a los partidos de derecha tradicional (conservadores, democristianos) como a los de izquierda tradicional (socialistas, socialdemócratas) y también al centro (ocupado normalmente por partidos liberales). Llamó socialdemócrata a esa forma de pensar porque, fuera quien fuera su ejecutor, consistía siempre en un Estado-nodriza omnipresente, con vocación paternalista y decidida a intervenir tanto en la economía como en la cultura y en las cuestiones morales.

Daba igual que los gobernantes pertenecieran a un partido de izquierdas o de derechas, porque las ’grandes cuestiones’, consensuadas entre todas las fuerzas políticas principales, imponían siempre este modelo de sociedad. Una sociedad asistida y adicta al Estado. Partidos conservadores y hasta sedicentes liberales se embarcaron en esta nave común a todas las fuerzas políticas democráticas, en lo que algunos consideraron el no va más de la vanguardia politológica, el sistema cuasi perfecto que nos diferenciaba tanto del totalitarismo soviético como del capitalismo ’descarnado’ y ’feroz’ de los Estados Unidos. La terrible paradoja es que el comunismo europeo cayó entre 1989 y 1991, pero esta especie de tercer camino siguió imponiéndose en Europa, inasequible al desaliento. Esa obsesión por la equidistancia entre el miserable terror de los gulags y el país de Jefferson es uno de los complejos incomprensibles de la vieja Europa, y nos ha pasado factura: el ciudadano se ha enganchado a la droga del híper estado que le inocularon los muchos discípulos de Olof Palme, y ahora a ver quién le ayuda a pasar un ’mono’ que promete ser dramático. A ver quién le devuelve la soberanía personal (y la responsabilidad, claro) y le enseña a valerse de nuevo por sí mismo.

Hoy, en pleno 2008, el sistema de las anteriores generaciones europeos muestra ya síntomas evidentes de fatiga crónica. El consenso socialdemócrata se ha convertido en el cansancio socialdemócrata. Los nuevos europeos se dan cuenta de que lo gratuito en realidad no existe, y comprenden que el Estado, para ’dar’ en su infinita bondad tantas cosas a tanta gente, tiene que ’quitarlas’ primero de algún sitio. Y ya no vale la excusa de que se quita a los ricos para darle a los ’pobres’,porque en unas sociedades donde más del noventa por ciento de la población constituye la capa media, es evidente que el Estado (ese Robin Hood miope) simplemente quita de donde puede y da a quienes más gritan.

Como hacedor de justicia social, el Estado se percibe cada día menos eficaz frente a la pura y simple espontaneidad de la acción humana. La vida y las finanzas se han sofisticado hasta extremos que hacen inviable (si es que alguna vez fue factible) la planificación de la economía, de la felicidad y de la vida por parte de los sesudos comités de expertos reunidos en sede ministerial. El orden espontáneo, como denominó el Nóbel de Economía Friedrich von Hayek a la acción simultánea de millones de personas, es más sabio y eficiente en la asignación de recursos que cualquier órgano burocratizado al servicio de los políticos.

Pero la sociedad, que siempre va varios pasos por delante de sus políticos, empieza a rechazar el insidioso paternalismo de los planificadores estatales. El hastío frente a los partidos políticos convencionales es una prueba de ello. La gente está cansada de oír a todos decir casi las mismas cosas. Quizá arrasaría en las urnas quien, en esta Europa de hoy, se atreviera a decir sin tapujos las verdades que todos sospechamos: que el Estado del bienestar se ha transformado en el bienestar del Estado y nos vampiriza a todos; que la justicia social ya no estriba en repartir bien la tarta sino en hacerla más grande para que alcance por sí misma a todos; que el poder político debe limitarse a mantener el orden y poco más porque cuando se mete a gestionar servicios resulta terriblemente ineficaz; y que los ciudadanos, de manera autónoma, podemos hacer mucho más por nosotros mismos y por los demás que cualquier Estado.

Publicado en La Region ( www.laregion.es ) el 4 de febrero de 2008.

Vientos de cambio en Europa Central

La victoria del partido Plataforma Cívica en las elecciones adelantadas de Polonia hace tres semanas podría marcar el principio del fin para el populismo en Europa Central. Los partidos que gobiernan en Polonia y Eslovaquia llegaron al poder prometiendo acabar con la corrupción, y la oposición húngara, la cual perdió las elecciones de este año por un margen muy pequeño, promete hacer lo mismo. El colapso del partido Ley y Justicia de Jaroslaw Kaczynski muestra que además de más seguridad y sentencias más severas, la lucha contra la corrupción debe incluir la reducción del tamaño y la envergadura del Estado.

Hace dos años, cuando los partidos políticos tales como Ley y Justicia lograron avances a lo largo de Europa Central, muchos comentaristas vieron esto como un rechazo de los partidos liberales y a las reformas que estos habían implementado. Dichas explicaciones ignoraban el resentimiento que la gente en la región le guardaba a las elites políticas corruptas que permanecían en el poder.

La corrupción en Europa Central es abundante. De acuerdo al Índice de Percepción de Corrupción de Transparencia Internacional, el cual mide la corrupción en una escala de 0 (más corrupción) al 10 (menos corrupción), Polonia cayó de 4,6 en 1998 a 3,4 en 2005. La República Checa cayó de 4,8 a 4,3, Hungría permaneció en el 5 y Eslovaquia aumentó de 3,9 a 4,3. Aunque los cuatro países mejoraron un poco en sus puntajes de percepción de corrupción para el 2006, estaban muy lejos del promedio de 7,2 de las naciones de la Organización para la Cooperación Económica y el Desarrollo.

La corrupción en Europa Central persiste principalmente por dos razones. Primero, a pesar de mucha liberalización económica a lo largo de los últimos 17 años, los gobiernos continúan gastando, en promedio, más del 40 por ciento del PIB regional. Sin embargo, a diferencia de Europa Occidental, donde el gasto público también es alto, el escrutinio parlamentario, la independencia judicial y la fortaleza de la sociedad civil en Europa Central siguen siendo relativamente subdesarrollados. Los programas de licitación pública carecen de transparencia y muchas veces son utilizados por funcionarios corruptos como vehículos para amasar fortunas personales.

Segundo, el ambiente de negocios en Europa Central sigue estando excesivamente regulado. El reporte Haciendo Negocios del Banco Mundial, por ejemplo, descubrió que en Eslovaquia, la República Checa, Hungría y Polonia se regula más duramente los negocios que en la mayoría de las economías desarrolladas, incluyendo la mayor parte de los países de la Unión Europea. Los ejércitos burocráticos en Europa Central tienen muchas oportunidades para extraer “mordidas” de las empresas privadas.

Los populistas en la región, incluyendo al partido Ley y Justicia en Polonia y el Smer de Eslovaquia, percibieron el descontento popular con el gasto opulento de las elites gobernantes y su riqueza mal concebida, y ganaron. Pero la corrupción en Europa Central es sistémica—no puede ser erradicada con mejores controles de licitación pública, como se trata de hacer actualmente. En cambio, la corrupción tiene que ser atacada reduciendo el tamaño y la envergadura del Estado y con ello las oportunidades para el auto-enriquecimiento de las elites políticas.

Como Oleh Havrylyshyn, ex viceministro de Finanzas de Ucrania, demuestra en su libro, Caminos divergentes en la transformación post-comunista: ¿Capitalismo para todos o capitalismo para algunos pocos?, los países que implementaron reformas económicas más radicales luego del colapso del comunismo experimentaron menos corrupción que aquellos países que optaron por reformas más graduales. La transición del comunismo al capitalismo fue mancillada por la corrupción, no debido a una liberalización excesiva, sino debido a que hubo muy poca. Tal vez esto explica por qué Estonia, país que es el más libre de todos los países ex comunistas, también tiene el puntaje más alto en el índice de percepción de corrupción.

A manera de contraste, los partidos que gobiernan en Polonia y Eslovaquia pospusieron más reformas económicas, de esta manera asegurando que la corrupción en la región continúe.

Una victoria liberal en Polonia podría señalar el principio del fin del populismo en Europa Central y, esperemos, un retorno a la agenda de reformas dentro de la región. Una vez en el poder, el partido Plataforma Cívica debería lidiar con la fuente de la corrupción en Polonia—un Estado demasiado grande. Lo mismo deberían hacer los reformistas potenciales en la región.

Autor: Marian Tupy

Marian L. Tupy es analista de políticas públicas del Centro para la Libertad y la Prosperidad Global del Cato Institute.

Fuente: Cato Institute

Avanza el nacionalismo y la xenofobia

La derecha avanza en Europa, y con el avance de la derecha se asocia la xenofobia. La racha victoriosa de las fuerzas políticas de derecha ha sido un fenómeno constante en los últimos cinco años en Europa, principalmente desde que Jean Marie Le Pen quedó en segundo lugar en las elecciones presidenciales francesas de 2002, desplazando a la izquierda a un tercer lugar y forzándola a apoyar al conservador Jacques Chirac en la segunda ronda electoral.
También las fuerzas de derechas han avanzado en Bélgica, Holanda, Alemania, Dinamarca, la tradicionalmente socialista Suecia, y ahora en Suiza.

Fuente: Patricia Cruz

El avance de las fuerzas de derecha en Europa se asocia a la inmigración y al sentimiento nacionalista creciente en este continente. El problema no es desde mi punto de vista la inmigración, sino el desgaste electoral de la izquierda en Europa. La izquierda ha predominado entre los gobiernos de los diferentes países de Europa por casi cincuenta años. El descontento de los habitantes europeos con la izquierda es, que esta no tiene respuestas a los problemas que sufren todas las instituciones que ha creado, como la seguridad social, el Estado de Bienestar, y el intervencionismo estatal en la economía, que han sido la bandera de la izquierda desde siempre. La excesiva presión tributaria para sostener el Estado de Bienestar y el gobierno, ha dejado a las empresas europeas fuera de competencia, pues Europa no puede exportar lo que produce, y a la inversa, la elevación de los salarios atrae a gente de otros países sumidos en la miseria.
El Estado de Bienestar es muy caro y está poniendo en riesgo en grave peligro al sistema económico, paradójicamente, el Estado de Bienestar puede convertirse en un estado de malestar.
La xenofobia no es propia de la derecha. En los Estados Unidos de América se está produciendo un sentimiento similar a Europa, pero este sentimiento viene del ala izquierda del espectro político de ese país: los demócratas.

Los demócratas mucho más que los republicanos de derecha están haciendo lobby en el Congreso para hacer aprobar legislación restrictiva contra los inmigrantes. Los demócratas están vinculados a sindicatos que presionan para limitar la entrada de inmigrantes que compiten con sus afiliados por salarios más bajos. La izquierda demócrata ha tenido avances substanciales en las últimas elecciones legislativas del Congreso de los Estados Unidos y de las legislaturas estaduales, principalmente en los estados con mayor inmigración como Nueva York, Nuevo México, Nevada, Texas y Florida, pero el sentimiento nacionalistas se ha fortalecido en los bastiones demócratas, estados con economías industriales y mucha clase obrera tales como Michigan, Pensilvania y California.

Diferencias entre el punto de vista americano y el europeo

Por Russell A Berman

Mas que ver el antiamericanismo europeo exclusivamente en clave de la habitual disputa política, vamos a profundizar en las diferencias culturales profundamente arraigadas. Según “Imágenes de un mundo cambiante”, un estudio dirigido por el Proyecto de Posturas Mundiales Asentadas, los americanos y los europeos occidentales defienden muy distintas posturas filosóficas, especialmente considerando los asuntos relacionados con la responsabilidad individual y el papel del estado.

Requeridos para valorar la afirmación “El éxito en la vida está prácticamente determinado por fuerzas que están fuera de nuestro control”, el 32 % de los americanos votaron afirmativamente, a diferencia del 48 por ciento en Inglaterra, el 54 % en Francia, el 66 % en Italia y el 68 % en Alemania. Sólo un tercio o menos de los americanos ven sus vidas marcadas por fuerzas ajenas, lo que implica que la mayoría ve el mundo en clave de responsabilidad individual. Mientras tanto, los europeos reducen al mínimo la responsabilidad individual y atribuyen mucha más importancia a fuerzas externas. Mientras que los europeos tienden hacia una visión del mundo determinista, los americanos apuntan hacia la libertad individual.

La encuesta valoró también cómo la opinión pública se posiciona entre dos valores contrarios: el valor de la libertad de los individuos para luchar por sus intereses sin las interferencias del estado por un lado, y el valor de la garantía del estado para que nadie pase necesidad, por el otro. El 58 % de los americanos, una mayoría significativa, elige ser libre de las interferencias del estado como el valor más importante. Este resultado indica un gran contraste con Europa, donde la libertad consigue un porcentaje de apoyo mucho más bajo: sólo el 39 % en Alemania, el 36 % en Francia, el 33 % en Inglaterra y sólo 24 % en Italia. Mientras que los americanos están predispuestos a entender sus vidas en clave de responsabilidad individual y rechazar la excesiva regulación del estado, los europeos, por lo general, toman la actitud opuesta: ven sus vidas en clave de servicios sociales a gran escala y esperan que el estado les proteja de las necesidades, incluso al coste de restringir su libertad. No asombra que las políticas internas actuales en la mayoría de los países europeos estén involucradas en la difícil tarea de reformar los firmemente arraigados sistemas de estado de bienestar.

Lógicamentelas diferencias culturales entre los americanos y los europeos tiene significativas repercusiones en la política exterior. El punto de vista americano de responsabilidad individual sustenta una insistencia en la soberanía nacional. En contraposición con los europeos, especialmente los franceses y los alemanes, que tienden a apoyar limitaciones al poder de los países. La lección que ellos sacaron de las dos guerras mundiales es que deberían ser colocados límites a los países para prevenir que luchen por intereses egoístas. Como consecuencia, los países europeos están cediendo gradualmente elementos de su soberanía al superestado de la Unión Europea. A diferencia de los Estados Unidos que han demostrado repetidamente su reticencia a ceder tal autoridad a organismos internacionales.

Esta es la base cultural para el debate sobre multilateralismo y unilateralismo. En la práctica, la diferencia es, casi absoluta. Aunque los políticos europeos insisten en la cooperación internacional, como de costumbre siguen persiguiendo intereses nacionales. Mientras los dirigentes americanos insisten en el derecho a actuar con independencia, han suplicado repetidamente a las Naciones Unidas por su apoyo. No obstante, las significativas diferencias en la cosmovisión entre los americanos y los europeos es probable que cause rupturas mucho más profundas que las que han tenido lugar habitualmente, como por ejemplo Irak y Kyoto.

Differences in American and European Worldviews
by Russell A. Berman
January 3, 2004

Rather than viewing European anti-Americanism solely in terms of current policy disputes, we must look at our deep-seated cultural differences. According to Views of a Changing World, a study conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Americans and West Europeans advocate very distinct philosophical stances, especially regarding matters of individual responsibility and the role of the state.
Asked to evaluate the statement "Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control," 32 percent of the Americans polled agreed, in contrast to 48 percent in England, 54 percent in France, 66 percent in Italy, and 68 percent in Germany. Less than a third of Americans view their lives as defined by external forces, implying that the majority see the world in terms of individual responsibility. Meanwhile, Europeans minimize individual responsibility and attribute much greater importance to outside forces. Whereas Europeans tend toward a deterministic worldview, Americans focus on individual freedom.
The survey also measured how public opinion chooses between two competing values: the value of the freedom of individuals to pursue goals without state interference and the value of a state guarantee that no one be in need. Fifty-eight percent of Americans, a significant majority, chose freedom from state interference as the most important goal. This result stands in stark contrast to Europe, where freedom earns support at dramatically lower rates: only 39 percent in Germany, 36 percent in France, 33 percent in England, and a paltry 24 percent in Italy. Whereas Americans are predisposed to understand their lives in terms of individual responsibility and reject greater state regulation, Europeans, by and large, take the opposite position: They view their lives in terms of larger social forces and expect the state to protect them from need—even at the price of a restriction of their freedom. No wonder current domestic politics in most European countries involves the difficult task of reforming firmly entrenched welfare-state systems.
Not surprisingly, the cultural difference between Americans and Europeans has significant foreign policy ramifications. The American worldview of individual responsibility underpins an insistence on national sovereignty. In contrast, Europeans—especially the French and the Germans—tend to support restraints on the power of individual states. The lesson they take away from the two world wars is that curbs should be placed on individual states to prevent them from pursuing selfish interests. As a result, European states are gradually ceding elements of their sovereignty to the superstate of the European Union. In contrast, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to cede such authority to international bodies.
This is the cultural basis for the debate over multilateralism and unilateralism. In practice, the difference is, of course, hardly absolute. Although European politicians insist on international cooperation, they typically continue to pursue national interests. Whereas the American leadership insists on the right to act independently, it has appealed repeatedly to the United Nations for support. Nonetheless, the significant differences in American and European worldviews are likely to cause political rifts long after the current battles, such as Iraq and Kyoto, have faded.

La Unión Europea no puede seguir así

Hasta hace un tiempo no tenía una opinión sobre el proyecto de Constitución Europea, pero ahora me doy cuenta de muchas cosas, y creo que ha sido bueno que fuese rechazada por Francia. Sarkozy propone un minitratado para UE con las claúsulas mínimas de una constitución. Pues el proyecto rechazado en el plebiscito francés constaba de 500 páginas. Eso no era una constitución, ni un tratado de libre comercio. La constitución de los Estados Unidos, está escrita en apenas 5 carillas y el texto original sólo tenía 7 artículos, y ha sido un verdadero tratado de integración que ha durado por 220 años, y tiene perspectivas de durar siglos. Estados Unidos es una unión mucho más perfecta que Europa.La acumulación de poder por Bruselas en desmedro de los estados nacionales, es lo contrario a lo que se debe hacer para preservar la libertad, pues el poder debe diseminarse, porque el poder es enemigo de la libertad y de la creación de riqueza. Los estados nacionales ya tienen demasiado poder acumulado y son la causa de tanto robo institucionalizado. La delegación de poder debería hacerse hacia abajo, es decir a las regiones, de estas a las provincias, y de estas a los municipios. Una nación como España con tantos problemas de separatismo, es evidente que las regiones vascas y catalanas reclaman más libertad para si mismas y menos intervención de Madrid, donde el gabinete está por encima de la Cámara de diputados y ésta por encima del Senado, que no tiene ningún función, salvo consultiva pero sin poder de veto. En Gran Bretaña el problema es similar a España, donde Escocia y Gales reclaman más autonomia de Londres.En el caso de Bruselas será lo mismo, los estados nacionales que integran la UE reclamarán más tarde por sus derechos cuando la Comisión Europea los sofoque con reglamentaciones.La UE heredera del Mercado Común Europeo, y de la Comunidad Europea creadas por Francia y Alemania, se ha vuelto paradójicamente contra estos países fundadores, porque la idea original se ha desvirtuado, y parece ser más conveniente para los estados que fueron satélites de U.R.S.S. con menor desarrollo económico y más pobreza y carencia de instituciones.La creación del Euro ha sido otro error grave, porque ha eliminado la competencia de monedas, dándole un monopolio al Euro; que juntamente, con el exceso de legislación, la insoportable carga fiscal en Europa para sostener la Seguridad Social y el Estado de Bienestar, las burocracias supranacionales, nacionales, regionales, etc han hecho que se un lugar poco atractivo para la inversión por la baja rentabilidad de las mismas, producto de esos costos fiscales que quitan competitividad de los productos europeos frente a otros mercados.La UE como está hoy, la defiende la izquierda sobre todo, que aboga por la intervención en la vida privada, el derroche de recursos, y la creación de organismos para controlar cualquier estupidez que se ponga de moda.